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Abstract :  
This paper discusses the relevant academic literature on organisational excellence, presents a longitudinal 
case study of a clothing manufacturing plant, and discusses the case study findings in the light of the 
literature. Based on this, four observations are made. First, the nature of organisational excellence is multi-
faceted, and cannot be simply equated with TQM or any other specific management approach. Second, 
although developing a Total Quality culture may yield significant benefits, improving operations does not, 
on its own, lead to sustainable organisational excellence. Instead, the organisation has to build its own, 
unique strategic position. Third, sustainable organisational excellence depends on building dynamic 
capabilities for organisational innovation. Fourth, top management performs two vital roles in sustaining 
organisational excellence: an administrative role of maintaining and exploiting existing organisational 
competences, and an entrepreneurial role of both continually developing and transforming existing 
organisational competences and searching for new competences in order to keep pace with changes in the 
environment.  
I. Review of relevant literature 
 
 
1. The meaning of organisational 
excellence 
 
 
Since the appearance of Peters and Waterman's "In 
Search of Excellence", organisational excellence has 
become a popular concept in the management literature. 
However, the precise meaning of this concept is still in 
dispute. Peters and Waterman (1982) emphasised the 
role of ‘shared values’ - as a vital element of 
organisational culture - in management’s drive towards 
organisational excellence. A school of thought has 
developed that regards business excellence as 
inextricably bound up with organisational culture. (See 
Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) for a brief discussion.) 
In another interpretation - not necessarily incompatible 
with the previous one - excellence is associated with 
quality. In their textbook, Bounds et al. (1994) state: 
“We define quality as a principle that encourages 
excellence in everything: products, strategies, systems, 
processes, and people.” (p.43; italics added). The link 
between excellence and quality has been further 
strengthened by the increasing popularity of the 
‘Business Excellence’ model developed by the European 
Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM). This 
model represents a ‘non-prescriptive framework’ for the 
implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM). 
 
It may be argued that the notion of excellence has been 
promoted recently to offset the waning popularity of 
TQM among practising managers. According to Ritchie 
and Dale (2000), “it appears that the concept [of TQM] 
has been rebadged as business excellence to move away 
from existing pre-concepts of TQM”. TQM itself may 
have become less popular because of the numerous 
studies reporting high failure rates among TQM 
programmes. (See Redman & Grieves (1999) for an 
overview and discussion.) On the other hand, a number 
of recent studies have shown that effective 
implementation of TQM principles and philosophies - 
as indicated by the winning of quality awards - does 
lead to significant improvements in the long-term 
performance of share prices (Hendricks and Singhal, 
2001; Easton and Jarrell, 1998). And, even ineffective 
implementation of TQM may not be without rewards, as 
argued by Redman and Grieves (op. cit.) as follows: “... 
the study of TQM failure is a valuable vehicle to extend 
our knowledge of strategic change management.” 
(p.45).  
 
The lack of a precise meaning for the concept of 
organisational excellence brings clear dangers that it 
will be - and, perhaps, already is - treated as yet another 
management ‘fashion’ or ‘fad’ (Abrahamson, 1996). It 
should be remembered that TQM itself has been 
criticised over the years as a consultant-driven 
‘panacea’ - i.e. a supposed remedy for all managerial 
problems - that promises much, but, in the end, delivers 
little (Gill and Whittle, 1992). Donaldson and Hilmer 
(1998) argue that the uncritical adoption of management 
fads may actually decrease organisational effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, many managers may be tempted by the 
findings of Staw and Epstein (2000) that, although “... 
companies associated with popular management 
techniques did not have higher economic performance 
... these same companies were more admired, perceived 
to be more innovative, and rated higher in management 
quality.” (p.523).   
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In the following sections we shall endeavour to give a 
clearer meaning to the concept of organisational 
excellence by broadening its context well beyond the 
confines of TQM, through linking it with some 
innovative and important ideas emerging from the field 
of strategic management. 
 
 
2. Total Quality culture and 
sustainable organisational 
excellence 
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the concept of 
organisational excellence has been associated with both 
organisational culture and TQM. Obviously, the latter 
two concepts are themselves strongly linked. Based on 
their analysis of the academic literature on 
organisational culture and on the findings from ‘an 
expert panel for articulating quality values’, Detert et 
al. (2000) propose a model of ‘TQM values and beliefs’. 
This model comprises eight dimensions, and is based 
on: scientific method in decision making; long-term 
orientation and strategic approach to management; the 
idea that quality problems are caused by poor systems - 
not lack of motivation from employees; continuous 
improvement; achieving results for the organisation’s 
stakeholders; cooperation and collaboration; shared 
vision and shared goals; customer-driven organisation. 
 
At first sight, it might appear that the model proposed 
by Detert et al. could form a basis for the pursuit of 
sustainable organisational excellence that is - at least for 
the majority of practising managers and management 
academics - relatively uncontentious. Indeed, in the 
resource-based view of the firm, an organisational 
culture of the type described in the Detert et al. model is 
often seen as a potential source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1986). This is 
because such a culture represents a ‘socially complex’ 
resource that is costly to imitate by competitors, and that 
is comparatively rare (Barney, 1994). (Hewlett-Packard 
has often been presented as an example of a firm that 
has derived sustained competitive advantage from its 
distinctive organisational culture, the ‘HP-way’ (Yoder, 
1991).) If we regard sustainable competitive advantage 
as at least a necessary consequence of - if not wholly 
synonymous with - sustainable organisational 
excellence (cf. Lawler’s (2000) definition of excellence 
in terms of ‘performance in the pursuit of the firm’s 
strategic objectives’), could not management’s drive 
towards organisational excellence be based on the 
building of a Total Quality culture?  
 
This idea is problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
as suggested by Thompson (1998), the pursuit of TQM 
is arguably based on a number of ‘paradoxes’ - i.e. 
contradictory principles. Thompson lists the following 
seven ‘paradoxes of Total Quality’: “seek diversity, but 
build a shared vision; encourage creativity, but be 
consistent in everything; focus on continuous process 
improvement, but make break-through improvement an 
important part of the job; use autonomous work groups 
to enhance performance, but ensure careful and uniform 
control of product and service quality; build a cohesive 
work team, but welcome conflict when critically 
analysing ideas; set realistic, yet challenging goals for 
maximum performance, but use stretch targets to 
dramatically improve performance; reward team effort, 
but create a high-performance climate for individuals” 
(p.71; italics added). We would argue that, in practice, 
there is unlikely to be ‘one best way’ for resolving such 
paradoxes. Instead, the (top) management of each 
specific organisation would have to make its own 
interlinked set of decisions regarding trade-offs between 
several desirable principles and goals. This naturally 
leads to the question: on what basis should such 
decisions be made? 
 
Second, Hayes and Pisano (1994) contend that “... 
simply improving manufacturing - by, for example, 
adopting JIT, TQM, or some other three-letter acronym 
- is not a strategy for using manufacturing to achieve 
competitive advantage. Neither is aspiring to lean 
manufacturing, continuous improvement, or world-class 
status.” (p.77; italics in original). (Note that ‘world-
class manufacturing’ is but a different way of denoting 
‘excellence in manufacturing’. Furthermore, note that 
there are no good reasons for believing that the same 
argument does not also apply to non-manufacturing 
organisations such as service businesses, or even public 
sector organisations!) One of the main arguments 
underlying Hayes and Pisano’s contention was 
developed by Porter (1980; 1985) and may be 
summarised as follows: “Constant improvement in 
operational effectiveness is necessary to achieve 
superior profitability. However, it is not usually 
sufficient. … Competitive strategy is about being 
different. It means deliberately choosing a different set 
of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.” (Porter, 
1996, pp.64-67; italics added). Whereas Porter stresses 
the need for management to make trade-off decisions 
throughout his writings, in his more recent work he also 
notes the importance of the ‘fit’ between the 
organisations’ activities and policies for the 
achievement and sustainability of competitive 
advantage (cf. Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1992) as an 
important influence on Porter’s thinking). (An example 
of recent empirical evidence for the importance of ‘fit’ 
between Quality Management policies and other 
dimensions of operations strategy such as Human 
Resource practices, is provided by Youndt et al. 
(1996).) Again, the question arises: if improving 
operations - through TQM or otherwise - does not form 
a sufficient basis for sustainable competitive advantage 
(and by implication for organisational excellence), on 
what basis should these difficult ‘strategic’ decisions 
(regarding trade-offs, fit and the incorporation of ‘best 
practice’) be made? In particular, how should these 
decisions be made when - as is currently the case in 
many, if not most industries - these decisions must be 
made in a competitive environment that is continually 
changing, sometimes very rapidly? 
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3. Dynamic capabilities and 
sustainable organisational 
excellence 
 
 
Hayes and Pisano (op. cit.) point towards an answer to 
the questions raised in the previous section: “Thinking 
about TQM, JIT, and other manufacturing improvement 
programmes not as ends in themselves, but in terms of 
the capabilities [that] they both require and create, 
drives one to think differently about solutions. ... In a 
dynamic setting, ..., solutions are viewed as part of a 
longer term path of improvement. ... From this 
perspective, manufacturing strategy is not just about 
aligning operations to current competitive priorities, but 
also about selecting and creating the operating 
capabilities [that] a company will need in the future.” 
(p.84; italics in original). In a similar vein, Glynn et al. 
(2000) discuss the “tension between the need to focus 
on current knowledge and skills to increase competitive 
advantage and the need to support a plurality of 
knowledge and skills to increase breadth, flexibility and 
innovation in the future ...” (p.729; italics added). The 
capabilities that an organisation needs to resolve this 
tension successfully - that is, the capabilities mentioned 
by Hayes and Pisano in the above quotation - are termed 
‘dynamic capabilities’ by Teece et al. (1997).   
 
Teece et al. (op. cit.) define dynamic capabilities as “the 
firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus 
reflect an organisation’s ability to achieve new and 
innovative forms of competitive advantage given path 
dependencies and market positions.” (p.516). A couple 
of comments are in order. First, the concept of dynamic 
capabilities is different from that of organisational 
culture, although there are similarities. Organisational 
culture - especially a ‘cooperative’ culture of the Total 
Quality type - may well be an important factor in 
developing a high level of coherence (or integration) 
among managerial and organisational processes. (Cf. 
Miller’s (1992) notion of a cooperative culture as 
‘mutually reinforcing expectations’ between the 
managers and employees of an organisation.) Such 
coherence is recognised by Teece et al. as a necessary 
element of dynamic capabilities. But these authors 
contend that other elements are also, if not more, 
important; namely, learning and reconfiguration / 
transformation. This leads to our second comment on 
the definition of dynamic capabilities. 
 
Learning and reconfiguration / transformation are vital 
organisational responses to ‘dynamic’ environments. 
(According to Teece et al. (op. cit.), dynamic 
environments are characterised by “rapid change in 
technology and market forces, and ‘feedback’ effects on 
firms” (p.512).) Learning - based on repetition and 
experimentation - leads to the generation of new 
organisational knowledge. According to the 
‘evolutionary theory’ of organisational economics 
formulated by Nelson and Winter (1982), such 
knowledge is primarily embodied in organisational 
‘routines’ - patterns of activities and interactions 
between organisational actors that represent lasting 
solutions to particular organisational problems. In 
Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) definition of dynamic 
capabilities, the concept of routines is given a central 
role: “Dynamic capabilities ... are the organisational and 
strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, 
and die.” (p.1107). The latter authors contend that in 
‘moderately’ dynamic environments, “dynamic 
capabilities resemble the traditional conception of 
routines. They are detailed, analytic, stable processes 
with predictable outcomes.” (p.1105). In contrast, in 
‘high-velocity’ environments, learning processes lead to 
outcomes that are - at least to a considerable extent - 
unpredictable. In such environments, organisational 
survival will depend on management’s “ability to scan 
the environment, to evaluate markets and competitors, 
and to quickly accomplish reconfiguration [of the firm’s 
asset structure] and transformation ahead of the 
competition.” (Teece et al., op. cit., p.521; italics 
added).  
 
As we have noted above, just making operational 
improvements is an insufficient basis for achieving 
organisational excellence - let alone sustaining it. 
Following Porter, Hayes and Pisano, Teece et al., and 
many other authors in the field of strategic management, 
we would argue that to achieve excellence, an 
organisation will have to develop - from its current 
strategic position and the technological and market 
opportunities available - its own distinctive managerial 
and organisational processes and asset structure. But in 
dynamic environments, merely achieving excellence is 
not enough. To sustain excellence, the organisation 
would have to build and exploit the kind of dynamic 
capabilities for organisational innovation that we have 
discussed above. 
 
 
4. The role of top management in 
sustaining organisational 
excellence 
 
 
If we accept the concept of dynamic capabilities as the 
basis for achieving and sustaining organisational 
excellence, there remains a question about the role that 
management in general, and top management in 
particular, should play in the development and 
exploitation of such capabilities. As we mentioned 
above, Thompson (op. cit.) noted the paradoxes inherent 
in the pursuit of TQM. But as discussed in various 
papers in the ‘Special Topic Forum on Change and 
Development Journeys into a Pluralistic World’ 
published in the October 2000 issue of the Academy of 
Management Review, paradoxes - such as between 
stability and change, a common culture (beliefs, goals, 
behaviours) and a collection of subcultures, efficiency 
and innovation, etc. - are at the root of the general 
problem of how to manage organisations effectively (cf. 
Eisenhardt, 2000). (Indeed, Kilduff and Dougherty 
(2000) demonstrate how much of the work of the 
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‘classic’ writers on organisations was concerned with 
such paradoxes.) It is up to top managers to manage the 
tension between the drivers for change (adaptability, 
cost containment, impatient capital markets, control, 
competitive advantage) and the drivers for stability 
(institutionalism, transaction costs, sustained advantage, 
organisational capital, predictability and uncertainty 
reduction) listed by Leana and Barry (2000). These 
paradoxes and tensions can only be resolved 
successfully by managerial decisions regarding trade-
offs, fit and the incorporation of best practice that shape 
the organisation’s distinctive strategic position. So how 
should top managers build the dynamic capabilities that 
would enable them to do this? 
 
Nadler and Tushman (1999) discuss six ‘strategic 
imperatives’ for organisations of the 21st century 
resulting from the changing business environment. To 
meet these imperatives, they provide a list of eight ‘core 
competencies’ that top managers must build through the 
development of ‘new and unconventional 
organisational architectures’. For example, the 
environment in many (not just high-tech!) industries is 
characterised by increasing ‘clock speed’. This results in 
a strategic imperative for management of timely 
anticipation and speedy response to change. To meet 
this imperative, management must configure the 
organisation in ways that increase the ‘organisational 
clock speed’. Although the specific strategic imperatives 
and core competencies advocated by Nadler and 
Tushman are intuitively appealing, there appears to be a 
comparative lack of ‘hard’ empirical evidence to 
underpin them. 
 
Knott (2001), on the other hand, does present empirical 
evidence to test a number of hypotheses related to the 
‘dual-routines view of the dynamic value of hierarchy’. 
She explains that, according to this view, “hierarchical 
managers perform two roles that create value for firms 
in perpetuity – an administrative role of enforcing 
operational routine, and an entrepreneurial role of 
executing a metaroutine that continually revises 
operational routine to keep pace with changes in the 
environment.” (p.430). (It is clear that this dual-routines 
view is closely related to the dynamic capabilities 
perspective that we discussed above.) Knott concludes 
that her empirical evidence - consisting of an in-depth 
examination of two firms in the quick-printing industry 
in the USA - supports the dual-routines view. But 
although Knott’s research provides ‘hard’ evidence that 
top managers do indeed play a vital role in building 
dual-routines (or dynamic capabilities) and exploiting 
them, we would argue that further in-depth longitudinal 
studies should be carried out in different environments 
(with respect to market, technology, country etc.) to 
extend and enrich her work. 
 
In the next section of this paper, we present a 
longitudinal study of strategic change in a clothing 
manufacturing plant in the UK (part of a large, 
multinational enterprise) in order to explore the role of 
top management in the pursuit of sustainable 
organisational excellence in an industry that has been 
subject to rapid environmental change over the last 
decade. 
 
 
II. Case study 
 
 
1. General background 
 
 
The clothing manufacturing plant under study was 
established in the UK some forty years ago. The 
company owning the plant experienced a decline in 
fortunes during the 1980s under the influence of both 
internal factors (loss of market share of the company's 
main brands) and external factors (lack of investment in 
new capital equipment). About ten years ago, it became 
part of a globally dispersed multinational enterprise 
(MNE) that manufactures a variety of types and styles 
of undergarments for women. The corporate 
headquarters of this MNE are based in the USA. Its 
European headquarters are in Italy, with product design 
and R&D functions based in France. 
 
Over the last few decades women’s undergarments have 
increasingly become fashion items, although 
obsolescence is still less rapid than for seasonal 
outergarments. As for all fashion items, product design 
is a key factor for competitive success. Garments must 
be reasonably priced and of acceptably high quality. 
The rate at which companies introduce new product 
lines is increasing; heavy advertising expenditure is 
used to support the brands. For new product launches to 
be successful, sufficient quantities of garments must be 
made available in the right locations, at the right time, 
and in the right mix of styles, colours and sizes. In 
Western Europe in general, and in the UK in particular, 
employment in the clothing industry as a whole has 
been in fast decline because of increasing competition 
from low-wage countries. 
 
The production process for women’s underwear is not 
very complex, and consists of the following stages: new 
product development (design and R&D); acquisition of 
raw materials (fabrics) of various kinds; cutting of the 
materials into the required shapes and sizes; sewing of 
the cut parts into finished garments; and distribution of 
the finished garments. Lead times have tended to be 
relatively long, particularly in new product development 
and material acquisition. However, throughout the 
1990s clothing manufacturers have been trying very 
hard to reduce lead times as part of their development of 
‘quick-response’ strategies. Quality control is critical in 
all stages of production. Economies of scale in 
production are relatively low, and the need for 
manufacturing flexibility very high. There is little 
automation except on the cutting stage. The sewing 
stage is highly labour-intensive (using mainly semi-
skilled labour). Production batches have tended to be 
relatively large but are becoming smaller. 
Manufacturing is undergoing a process of globalisation: 
the successive stages of the production process (or value 
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chain) are being separated and globally dispersed to 
reduce labour costs. 
 
 
2. Developments between 1990 and 
1995 
 
 
By about 1990, the plant's survival was at issue; it was 
the only remaining plant in the UK and one of three 
(soon to be two) production locations in Western 
Europe. At that time, a new UK Manufacturing Director 
arrived who began making strenuous efforts to turn 
around the deteriorating situation. Operational strategy 
was reviewed with a view to achieving radical 
improvements in production efficiency and customer 
service. Two issues, in particular, were addressed with 
respect to the UK plant: internally, the organisation of 
production in the plant itself; and externally, the 
development of an international manufacturing network 
(IMN), and the changing role of the plant within this 
network. We first visited the plant in 1994. Our initial 
research focus was on the changes that were being made 
to shop floor working practices within the plant, 
especially with regard to the ongoing reorganisation of 
the sewing stage of manufacturing (Van der Meer and 
Gudim, 1996). Subsequently we also investigated how 
the plant’s role in the company’s IMN was changing 
(Van der Meer et al., 1996). More recently (2000-2001) 
we have been revisiting the plant, and have interviewed 
top management and others about the latest 
developments. 
 
In common with the rest of the clothing industry, the 
plant had traditionally operated a 'progressive bundle' 
(that is, progressive assembly in batches) system. This 
tended to result in large build-ups of buffer stock, slow 
feedback on quality problems and a correspondingly 
high level of rework. By 1993 the new Manufacturing 
Director, as part of a strategic move towards 'quick-
response' manufacturing, began to replace conventional 
sewing lines with group working cells (so that by May 
1995, a quarter of sewing machine operators were in 
group working cells). Such cells gave workers greater 
control over how activities were coordinated, a 
somewhat longer task cycle and lower level of task 
specialisation (but no significant reduction in the level 
of task standardisation). Importantly, whereas on the 
conventional lines product quality was ‘inspected-in’, 
members of the group working cells were given direct 
responsibility for improving product quality and 
reducing rework. Early results (1994-1995) from the 
cells showed that work-in-process inventory levels were 
significantly reduced and that, in consequence, product 
throughput times were much shorter. Quality problems 
tended to be picked up much more quickly (by the 
worker themselves rather than by quality inspectors), 
and the level of rework was, as a result, much reduced. 
The level of product flexibility (especially the ability to 
cope with the increasingly rapid introduction of new 
garments and styles) was also raised significantly in the 
cells. Finally, it appeared that the level of job 
satisfaction among sewing machine operators had been 
raised, with absenteeism and labour turnover both 
reduced (Van der Meer and Gudim, op. cit.). 
 
 
3. Issues and problems in 1995 
 
 
Although by 1995 the introduction of group working 
cells was considered a success by the Manufacturing 
Directors and the senior managers reporting to him (and 
had won plaudits from the company’s European 
headquarters in Italy), significant issues and problems 
still remained for the plant. First, most of the sewing 
was still done on the remaining conventional sewing 
lines. The setting up of additional group working cells 
proved to be a slow process, involving a significant 
investment of additional sewing machinery and, perhaps 
even more importantly, of management time. Also, 
resistance was becoming apparent from at least some of 
the employees on the conventional lines who were not 
necessarily keen to adjust to the different working 
conditions in the group working cells. In response, the 
Manufacturing Director initiated a reorganisation of the 
conventional lines in the form of ‘SQC lines’ (SQC: 
Statistical Quality Control). The SQC lines were based 
on the implementation of appropriate statistical 
principles and procedures for quality improvement, 
including in-process - instead of end-of-line - quality 
control, quality improvement workshops etc. Although 
sewing machine operators on the SQC lines continued 
to work on an individual basis rather than in groups, 
these lines proved to be effective in raising quality 
standards, and were much cheaper to set up than the 
group working cells. As a result, by the end of 1995, 
group working cells and SQC lines were working side 
by side, and there seemed to be some doubt whether the 
previously-intended full conversion of the sewing floor 
to group working principles would actually take place. 
 
A second remaining problem in 1995 concerned the 
logistics linking the sewing stage with both the 
preceding and succeeding stages of production - and, in 
general, the difficulties in moving materials and 
products quickly through the supply chain. The plant 
had benefited from recent heavy capital investment in 
new cutting machinery, transforming the performance 
of the cutting process. In a sense, the cutting process 
was becoming a source of excellence for the plant. But 
the material flow from cutting to sewing suffered from 
frequent disruption and delay. Similarly, the benefits of 
reducing work-in-progress in the sewing stage were 
significantly reduced by the high level of finished good 
stocks in the distribution centres. In other words, 
although the new operational strategy was proving 
successful in radically improving the performance of the 
cutting and sewing stages in the UK plant, its overall 
effectiveness was diminished because other elements of 
the strategy were taking longer to change. In particular, 
the Manufacturing Director recognised that managerial 
roles had to be re-examined, both in terms of their 
hierarchical position and with regard to the integration - 
or lack of it - among the various functional areas of the 
plant. Addressing such structural issues was more 
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difficult because some of the functional managers 
involved had spent the greater part of their working 
lives at the plant, and tended to be highly traditional in 
approach. (Perhaps not surprisingly, there was also a 
high turnover of newer managers.) Thus, although there 
had been an apparent culture change among shop floor 
employees - based on a new emphasis on quality 
improvement, cooperation and collaboration etc. - the 
prevailing culture among the senior managers reporting 
to the Manufacturing Director could still be 
characterised by a 'command and control' style whereby 
information was only slowly passed on between the 
various functions and there was little in the way of 
delegation. (The current Manufacturing Director - who 
came to the plant as Quality Manager in 1991- describes 
the managerial culture of the time as based on a 'blame' 
philosophy. ) 
 
The third remaining issue in 1995 related to the 
changing role of the UK plant in the company’s 
developing IMN. Until the end of the 1980s the 
orientation of the company’s IMN was largely 
‘multidomestic’. (A network with a multidomestic 
orientation consists of “more or less autonomous 
manufacturing units geographically located close to 
target markets.” (Shi and Gregory, 1995, p.426).) In 
response to increasing competitive pressures, the 
structure of the company’s IMN began to change from 
the start of the 1990s by assuming a ‘global’ orientation. 
New product development activities for the West-
European markets were moved from the USA to Europe 
to improve the effectiveness of the design-
manufacturing interface, and an extensive programme 
of factory closures was initiated to improve 
manufacturing efficiency. By 1995 there were only two 
main manufacturing plants left in Western Europe: the 
UK plant under study (with both cutting and sewing 
facilities) and a plant in France (with cutting facilities 
only). To offset the sewing capacity closed down in 
Western Europe, ‘off-shore’ sewing plants had been 
started up in various low-wage countries. The French 
plant had become the ‘mother plant’ - or ‘lead plant’ 
(Ferdows, 1989) - to a number of sewing plants in North 
Africa; and the UK plant was developing into the lead 
plant for a number of sewing plants in Eastern Europe 
(and also a new plant being established in India). But 
whereas the French plant tended towards a command-
and-control style in its relations with its off-shore 
sewing plants, the Manufacturing Director of the UK 
plant favoured giving greater autonomy to the local 
managers of its off-shore sewing plants. In all this, there 
was a key problem for the Manufacturing Director. 
Given his perception that ‘the requirement to learn how 
to operate effectively under completely different 
parameters’ was the company’s most basic challenge in 
manufacturing terms, how could more flexible and 
adaptive organisational structures be developed to 
improve the learning ability generated by the IMN? And 
how could the individual plants (including the UK 
plant) develop their respective strategic roles in the IMN 
in order to enable the company to find its own - unique - 
solution to its managerial challenges? (Cf. Van der 
Meer et al., 1996). 
 
To answer to this last question, the Manufacturing 
Director started building the UK plant’s competence in 
acting as the main bridge between the company’s new 
product development and order fulfilment processes. By 
1995 new product lines in the company’s most 
successful product families were sewn at the UK plant, 
where there was close control over the production 
process. When quality problems had been resolved, and 
the manufacturing process rationalised, sewing 
operations were moved to the off-shore plants. In this, 
the latter received technical support and training from a 
team at the UK plant. But in 1996 there were two events 
that had a significant impact on this development. First, 
the Manufacturing Director left to take up a more senior 
position in another company, and was replaced from 
within the company. Second, the company was hit by a 
temporary downturn at the end of 1996. As it was 
obvious that labour - and, therefore, sewing - costs at 
the UK plant were substantially higher (by a factor of 
between four and five!) than at the offshore plants, the 
company’s European headquarters decided to close 
down a substantial amount of sewing capacity at the UK 
plant. The number of sewing machine operators was cut 
(by natural wastage) by one-third. The new 
Manufacturing Director decided to do this by closing 
down a large number of conventional sewing lines, but 
leaving the number of group working cells unchanged. 
As a result, by the end of 1996 roughly the same 
number of sewing machine operators worked in cells as 
on the SQC lines (i.e. the redesigned conventional 
lines). In other words, although the new Manufacturing 
Director had to accept that new product lines could now, 
in principle, be moved straight to the off-shore plants 
for sewing, he put even greater emphasis on the UK 
plant’s competences in group working with its attendant 
benefits of quality, responsiveness and flexibility. (Note 
that sewing at the off-shore plants has always been, and 
still is, organised on the basis of conventional sewing 
lines.) 
 
 
4. Developments between 1996 and 
1999 
 
 
There was thus a re-evaluation of the operational 
strategy at this time (end of 1996). Although the group 
working cells were perceived to be successful, both 
manufacturing costs and product quality had to be 
improved further. The former was to be done by further 
expansion of sewing volumes at the off-shore plants; the 
latter by targeting any reduction in sewing volumes in 
the UK plant at the conventional / SQC sewing lines but 
maintaining volumes in the group working cells. The 
changing nature of the company’s product markets 
provided added urgency. Marketing was increasingly 
focusing on high quality but relatively low cost 
garments with drastically reduced product life cycles of 
between three and six months. As a result, ever greater 
demands were being made on the shopfloor in terms of 
on-time delivery and high levels of product flexibility. 
The new Manufacturing Director decided, therefore, to 
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alter radically the organisational structure and culture at 
the upper managerial levels of the UK plant - not just to 
improve the performance of the UK plant but also to be 
able to give more effective support to its off-shore 
plants. 
 
From 1996, the managerial structure at the plant was 
changed through the retiral of most of the (male) ‘old 
guard’ management, and their replacement by a new 
senior management team of just three relatively young 
managers (two of them female - reflecting the gender of 
the vast majority of shopfloor workers!) reporting 
directly to the Manufacturing Director. Functional areas 
that had traditionally been separated were now 
combined into three main lines of authority: Production, 
Quality and Logistics; thereby achieving much greater 
integration between functional areas - and therefore 
much greater managerial flexibility - than had been the 
case so far. Although the members of this senior 
management team had been promoted from within the 
plant, and there were also other internal promotions of 
promising younger managers, a number of new graduate 
management trainees were recruited from local 
Universities to increase the amount of ‘new blood’ in 
the management structure. From interviews with the 
current Manufacturing Director (who, at the time, was 
one of the members of the new senior management 
team) we may conclude that the managerial culture in 
the plant was undergoing a gradual but significant 
change towards greater openness and knowledge-
sharing - the new key word becoming ‘visibility’ (of 
information, results etc.) 
 
The managerial structure and culture in the UK plant 
also favourably affected the support that it could give to 
its off-shore sewing plants. As mentioned above, it had 
been decided by the previous Manufacturing Director 
not to impose a conventional command-and-control 
style on relations with the off-shore locations (not least 
because the geographical distances obscured ‘product 
visibility’ and, therefore, appeared to make such a 
management style relatively ineffective). Instead, these 
plants were supported by their UK ‘mother’ plant in 
developing their own, local managerial skills in order to 
improve cost efficiency and quality. For example, when 
in 1996 the greenfield plant in India was being 
developed, it was expected that this plant could be 
operational quickly given the local skill base in clothing 
manufacturing. But the new Manufacturing Director felt 
that there had to be managerial representation from the 
UK plant so that the Indian managers would quickly 
become knowledgeable about the company’s products 
and production standards. Accordingly, it was decided 
that two managerial teams would be set up from the UK 
plant: they would rotate with regard to visiting the 
Indian site with the purpose of sharing manufacturing 
know-how etc. It can thus be seen that the key strategic 
issues of increasing competitiveness by establishing 
low-cost off-shore plants able to produce to a similar 
standard as the UK plant and the reform of management 
structure, culture and practices were, in practice, 
interdependent. 
 
 
5. Developments since 1999 
 
 
The current Manufacturing Director took over in 1999. 
(Her predecessor was promoted to a more senior 
position in another company owned by the MNE.) In 
early 1999 the number of sewing machine operators in 
the UK plant was further reduced by some 35-40% 
(through relatively generous payoffs agreed with 
European headquarters, and no compulsory 
redundancies), again by closing conventional sewing 
lines. Only two conventional lines now remain, 
comprising only about 20% of the operators, with the 
remainder in the group working cells. As a result, the 
UK plant is now responsible for only about 13% of total 
sewing volumes in its geographical area (Northern 
Europe), with its off-shore plants taking the remaining 
87%. All employees in the UK plant are on permanent 
contracts. Despite these moves towards greater cost 
competitiveness, there is still a very substantial 
difference in labour costs (measured in cost per standard 
sewing hour) between the UK lead plant and its off-
shore plants. Therefore, to safeguard the UK plant’s 
longer-term future, the current Manufacturing Director 
must continuously look for ways of building on the 
plant’s existing competences and, if necessary, develop 
new ones. 
 
Over the last five years, and driven by the changes in 
the managerial structure and culture discussed above, 
the plant has become recognised within the company as 
a ‘centre for managerial excellence’. All three members 
of the senior management team formed in 1996, have 
now been promoted to Directorships within the 
company (one, as already noted, to the position of 
Manufacturing Director; the other two to other 
important positions), opening up vacancies for new 
managerial talent. (In consequence, the plant’s 
organisational structure has had to be changed again by 
narrowing the managerial responsibilities of the newly-
promoted managers, since none of them have the 
experience yet to take on the wide-ranging roles of the 
previous incumbents. However, the Manufacturing 
Director intends to re-establish a small, but flexible, 
senior management team as soon as practicable.) Also, 
the plant has developed a reputation for being able and 
willing to provide quick and helpful advice on 
managerial problems raised by other plants in the 
company. 
 
The culture of ‘visibility’ actively promoted by the 
current Manufacturing Director, extends to the issue of 
performance measurement. Targets and business results 
achieved are discussed at monthly meetings between the 
Manufacturing Director and the various managers 
reporting to her. The latter can earn modest 
performance-related bonuses based on five main 
measures (including various financial measures, quality, 
on-time delivery, and health & safety). Should targets 
not be met, such openness - according to the current 
Manufacturing Director - would in the early 1990s have 
resulted in defensiveness among managers. Whereas 
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now, the fact that the new management team has ‘grown 
up’ together has facilitated a more natural culture of 
teamworking (which is also encouraged by the greater 
openness of the managerial office layout). The spirit of 
openness also extends to the shop floor, where operators 
now have a much better understanding of how well or 
otherwise customer service targets are being met. In line 
with this policy, the Manufacturing Director places a 
high value on training at all levels, and budgets for this 
accordingly. (The plant has the UK ‘Investors In 
People’ standard). Training 'away weekends' occur 
regularly, and include those working at all levels who 
may have managerial potential. Finally, the 
Manufacturing Director emphasises the importance of 
personality, in terms of recruitment of those who will 
'fit in' with the openness of the culture, and who will 
thus have a positive, 'knock-on' effect on colleagues. 
This can be particularly important for successful 
cooperation with managers of the off-shore plants. 
 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 
What light can the academic literature on organisational 
excellence shed on our understanding of the case study? 
And what new insights can the case study provide in 
relation to the literature on organisational excellence? 
 
Our first observation relates to the multi-faceted nature 
of organisational excellence in the case study plant. 
There can be little doubt that the plant has developed a 
degree of excellence over the last decade. Not just 
because the plant still survives, whereas many similar 
clothing manufacturing plants in Western Europe in 
general, and the UK in particular, have been closed. But 
more particularly because the plant appears to have 
contributed significantly to the competitive success of 
the company, and is consequently held in high esteem 
by the European headquarters of the company (as is 
clear from various pointers in the case study). There 
appears to be no single dominant factor - such as 
organisational culture, quality performance, technical 
know-how, managerial style, etc. - that this excellence 
can be readily ascribed to. Quite simply, the plant has, 
over time, build specific competences in all of these 
areas – and others, too. And management has achieved 
this without any formal implementation of a specific 
improvement program such as TQM or BPR. We may 
regard this as an indication that simply equating 
organisational excellence with TQM or any other 
specific management approach, may involve taking far 
too narrow a view. 
 
It is also quite clear that it would be wrong to dismiss 
the concept of organisational excellence immediately as 
just another management ‘fad’. In their pursuit of 
excellence, we could not find any evidence of ‘fad’-type 
thinking on the part of management. On the contrary, 
the successive Manufacturing Directors have all tended 
to take a very level-headed view of the plant’s strategic 
position. This resulted in them, at times, having to make 
painful decisions in terms of laying off employees to 
safeguard the continuing survival of the plant as a 
whole. In general, the building of specific 
manufacturing competences in the plant has involved 
numerous choices, including difficult trade-off 
decisions, by its top management. 
 
Our second observation is concerned with the 
importance of quality improvement and the 
development of a cooperative quality culture in the 
achievement of excellence in the case study plant. 
Although, as mentioned above, there was no formal 
implementation of a TQM programme, the ‘language’ 
of TQM came into wide use – for instance, the ‘SQC 
lines’. And most, if not all, of the eight dimension of 
Detert et al.’s (op. cit.) model of ‘TQM values and 
beliefs’ were in evidence in the plant. In other words, 
from the early 1990s onward there appeared to be a 
growing (Total) Quality culture in the plant. However, 
the ‘paradoxes of Total Quality’ suggested by 
Thompson (op. cit.) were also obvious. For instance, 
continuous process improvement was not always 
enough; break-through improvement was also needed 
from time to time - and the latter might involve laying 
off employees to improve the cost competitiveness of 
the UK plant. 
 
Most importantly, from an early stage it was clear that 
quality improvement on its own was not going to give 
the plant a lasting advantage relative to its competitors 
both within and outside the company. Other plants were 
improving quality, too. And quality improvement could 
not, in practice, solve the fundamental problem of the 
UK plant’s high labour costs relative to the off-shore 
locations: other actions were also needed. Therefore, in 
building and sustaining organisational excellence, the 
plant did indeed - as suggested by Porter, Hayes and 
Pisano, and others - have to develop its own, unique 
blend of specific competences (including a cooperative 
culture, quality improvement, group working cells, 
technical know-how in the cutting process, growing 
skills throughout the managerial hierarchy) as well as its 
specific strategic role in the company’s manufacturing 
network. 
 
Our third observation relates to the path taken by the 
plant on its journey to organisational excellence. 
Although the benefit of hindsight may enable us to 
detect a certain logic in the development of the plant’s 
organisational excellence, the path was by no means 
clear in the early 1990s. The plant has been subject to 
rapid environmental change over the last decade. This 
change was driven by two main factors. First, the 
changing nature of the company’s target market 
segments – in particular, the substantial reduction in 
product life cycles, resulting in an ever-increasing 
industry ‘clock speed’ (Nadler and Tushman, op. cit.). 
Second, the increasingly strong move towards 
globalisation of production networks in the clothing 
industry – in particular, the relocation of sewing 
facilities to low-wage countries. As argued by Teece et 
al. (op. cit.), the rapidity of the environmental change 
makes it impractical simply to leverage existing (core) 
competences. Instead, existing competences must be 
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further developed and, if necessary, reconfigured or 
transformed; and new competences must also be sought. 
In short, sustainable organisational excellence depends 
on dynamic capabilities for organisational innovation. 
The case study demonstrates the process of learning and 
experimentation followed by the plant in its continuing 
pursuit of organisational excellence, and provides clear 
indications of the building of these dynamic capabilities. 
For instance, whereas by the mid 1990s a degree of 
excellence had developed on the shop floor (based on a 
certain amount of experimentation with different types 
of work organisation), much of the managerial structure 
and culture was still unreformed. However, the learning 
gained through the shop floor changes provided a 
powerful stimulus towards the subsequent changes in 
the managerial hierarchy and the building of managerial 
excellence. 
 
Our final observation is concerned with the role of top 
management in achieving and sustaining organisational 
excellence in the plant. It is clear from the case study 
that the three successive Manufacturing Directors have 
played a vital role in building the plant’s dynamic 
capabilities. In accordance with the ‘dual-routines view 
of the dynamic value of hierarchy’ (Knott, op. cit.), they 
not only ensured the plant’s survival in the short term 
(by delivering consistent business results to the 
European headquarters of the company), but also 
provided the main impetus towards the organisational 
innovations necessary for its long-term success. It 
should be noted that both of the previous two 
Manufacturing Directors, and the current incumbent, are 
strong personalities; but also, that all three of them have 
put enormous effort into developing the managerial 
talents of their younger subordinates. In short, the 
successive Manufacturing Directors have been the ones 
mainly responsible for increasing the ‘organisational 
clock speed’ so that it matches that of the environment, 
while simultaneously maintaining - and even 
significantly strengthening - the organisational 
coherence of the plant. 
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